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ABSTRACT
This note calls for an end to Major League Baseball’s statutory exemption from
antitrust law for acts that are considered part of the “business of baseball.” The Curt
Flood Act was a Congressional mistake, the product of years of faulty analysis and
absurd holdings by the Supreme Court. This note will explain how the exemption
came to fruition, outline the various problems with its inception, and conclude by
proposing that Major League Baseball should be subject to antitrust law, just like all
other professional sports leagues.
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“Baseball is America’s pastime, but football is truly
America’s passion.”1
- Howie Long
INTRODUCTION

M

ajor League Baseball’s (MLB) statutory exemption to antitrust
law under the Curt Flood Act—derived from case law, archaic
societal viewpoints, and erroneous interpretation principles—should
be repealed to place MLB under the same scrutiny as every other
professional league. Take, for example, that on October 3, 2011,
almost eleven million viewers tuned in to watch the Monday Night
Football game on ESPN between the Indianapolis Colts and the Tampa
Bay Buccaneers.2 That same night, the New York Yankees baseball
team was playing against the Detroit Tigers in an American League
Divisional Series playoff game.3 Only 6.05 million viewers watched
the Yankees play the Tigers.4 This is one example of the disconnect
between what Americans call their pastime and how we actually pass
time.
Major League Baseball, the dominant professional group for
American baseball, enjoys a significant qualified immunity from
antitrust law that, despite evidence undermining its reasoning, 5
remains codified in a federal statute.6 This note will look at the case
law, the social context, and the logic that gave rise to MLB’s
exemption, and explain not only why it should be repealed, but also
why none of the major sports should be exempt from antitrust law,
save for very limited circumstances.
This note will begin in Part I by addressing the purpose and impact
of antitrust laws. Part II will briefly explain how antitrust law affects
1

2

3
4
5
6

Howie Long, Enshrinement Speech to the Pro Football Hall of Fame (June 29,
2000), available at http://www.profootballhof.com/history/release.aspx?release
_id=751.
Michael David Smith, Monday Night Football Easily Beats Baseball Playoff TV
Ratings, PRO FOOTBALL TALK (Oct. 5, 2011, 1:54 PM), http://profootballtalk
.nbcsports.com/2011/10/05/monday-night-football-easily-beats-baseballplayoffs-tv-ratings/.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part V.A.
See 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2006).
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professional sports leagues. Part III will address the courts’ and
Congress’ willingness to grant various exemptions from antitrust law
to activities carried out by professional sports leagues. Part IV
delineates the history of how Major League Baseball’s statutory
exemption, known as the Curt Flood Act, came to fruition. Part V, the
major focus of this note, will address the fallacies in reasoning behind
both the major court decisions and Congress’ improper codification of
these decisions. Finally, Part VI will offer that Major League Baseball
should be subject to antitrust law, just like any other professional
sports league is.
I. ANTITRUST LAWS AND THEIR IMPACT ON HOW PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS ARE CONDUCTED
The gravity of antitrust laws, and the threat of a suit filed for any
alleged violation, greatly affects how leagues and teams make business
decisions regarding the league or players.7 But before looking at
antitrust laws and their application to MLB in more detail, a baseline
understanding of why antitrust laws exist is necessary. This primer
will aid in comprehending how incongruous the MLB’s exemption to
antitrust law is.
Antitrust laws are grounded on the principle that, in an open, free
market, there should never be an instance when competition among
economic rivals inhibits trade.8 The goal is to protect the consumer
from groups of individuals either coming together or acting in a
7

8

See, e.g., McCourt v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193, 1194 nn.1,2 (6th Cir.
1979) (discussing the reserve system once common to most major league sports
under which players were not free to sign with another team, even after their
contract expired, unless the new team paid an exaction to the original team).
See Nw. Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir.
1978) (“[I]t is the elimination of the competition, by fair means or foul, that is
the concern of the antitrust law . . . .”). For example, in considering the National
Basketball League’s decision to reduce the playing season by five games, the
Federal District Court in Chicago Professional Sports Limited Partnership v.
National Basketball Association, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1362 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff’d,
961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992), held that, “The record plainly establishes that the
NBA’s 5-game reduction restrains trade and suppresses competition between the
teams and the league and [TV networks]. The NBA has provided no evidence
establishing that the reduction promotes competition, or will, between NBA
basketball games or NBA games and other television programming of any
kind.”
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monopolistic capacity to restrain trade.9 The Sherman Act10 was
enacted in 1890 with these goals in mind.11
In any antitrust suit, a plaintiff must initially show that the alleged
conduct affects interstate commerce in some form.12 If the plaintiff can
prove that the alleged restraint affects interstate commerce, the
plaintiff must then satisfy three main requirements: (1) a collusive
effort by two or more economic rivals, or “duality”; (2) an
unreasonable restraint on trade; and (3) damages.13
With the goals of antitrust laws in mind, it is easy to see how the
threat of enforcement might affect business decisions.14 If a company
is aware that its actions may violate antitrust laws, the company will
likely choose a different course of action.15 Thus, the looming threat

9

10

11

12

13
14

15

Monopolies are governed by 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). They will not be the focus of
this note.
Act of July 2, 1890, Pub. L. No. 51-647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2006) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”)).
See, e.g., Nelson O. Fitts, Note, A Critique of Noncommercial Justifications for
Sherman Act Violations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 478, 483–84 (1999).
Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911) (“There must be
some direct and immediate effect upon interstate commerce in order to come
within the act.”); United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 461 (1920)
(Day, J., dissenting) (“[I]t was the purpose of the Sherman Act to condemn,
including all combinations and conspiracies to restrain the free and natural flow
of trade in the channels of interstate commerce.”). See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 n.1 (1984).
See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. at 99–127.
“The goal of the antitrust laws is to protect economic freedom and opportunity
by promoting free and fair competition in the marketplace. Competition in a free
market benefits American consumers through lower prices, better quality and
greater choice. Competition provides businesses the opportunity to compete on
price and quality, in an open market and on a level playing field, unhampered by
anticompetitive restraints. Competition also tests and hardens American
companies at home, the better to succeed abroad.” Antitrust Division Mission,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/atr/about/mission.html (last
visited Dec. 3, 2012).
This may be especially true given that a company’s officers, directors, and
agents can be held personally responsible for knowing violations. See United
States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 416 (1962) (“Based upon the foregoing, we hold
that a corporate officer is subject to prosecution under s 1 of the Sherman Act
whenever he knowingly participates in effecting the illegal contract,
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imposed by antitrust laws protects consumers by curbing collusive
conduct and maintaining an open market.16 The next section will
examine how antitrust law affects the decisions of professional sports
entities, and how a challenge to league activity might be raised.
II. ANTITRUST LAW AND CHALLENGES IN SPORTS
This section will show the relationship between the different
parties in professional sports and the kinds of activities that might give
rise to a viable antitrust claim. Knowing the kinds of activities that
may raise an antitrust claim is important in order to understand the
kind of normally illegal activities from which Major League Baseball
is immune. This section will first address the connections between the
parties involved in the production of professional sports. It will then
discuss the steps needed to sue for antitrust violations in the world of
sports.
The parties involved in the production of professional sports can be
classified into three different groups: the players, the teams, and the
league.17 The players are legally connected to their team or club
through the standard player contract.18 The players are legally involved
with the league through the collective bargaining agreement.19 Finally,
the team is connected to the league through the bylaws that each team

16

17

18

19

combination, or conspiracy-be he one who authorizes, orders, or helps perpetrate
the crime-regardless of whether he is acting in a representative capacity.”).
See generally Robert H. Lande, Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were
Passed to Protect Consumers (Not Just to Increase Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS
L.J. 959 (1999) (discussing the purpose of antitrust law from an economic
perspective).
See Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 647
(1989).
See generally WALTER T. CHAMPION JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW
§ 16:3. For examples of common terms contained in standard player contracts
which have been the subject of antitrust cases, see Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,
259 n.1, and Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 610 n.5 (8th Cir.
1976).
Collective bargaining agreements are not the subject of this note and are only
used anecdotally to provide a complete picture of MLB and its relationship with
antitrust law.
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votes on which to adopt.20 The bylaws govern the rules and laws to
which each team must conform.21
In many sports situations, members, teams, or players challenge
actions taken by the league under 15 U.S.C. § 1.22 Potential § 1
violations occur when economic rivals come together to inhibit
competition within interstate commerce.23 When an antitrust case is
filed, sports leagues such as MLB or the National Football League
(NFL) often move to dismiss the suit with the affirmative defense that
they are acting as a ‘single entity’ regarding the conduct at issue.24
Because § 1 challenges are premised on economic rivals coming
together in a collusive effort, there can be no collusive acts if the court
determines that the groups involved are not independent, distinct
identities.25 Courts have frequently found that leagues do not act as a
single entity, but rather as groups of individual organizations.26
20

21

22
23

24

25

Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional
Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 907 (1999) (“The bylaws of the professional sports
leagues have been designed to make expansion difficult, thus restricting the
output of professional sports franchises. Indeed, the bylaws of Major League
Baseball, the NFL, the NBA, and the NHL do not provide any objective
standards for membership at all. They simply require a three-fourths vote of all
of the owners for the admission of new teams.”).
See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 610 (“The League performs various administrative
functions, including organizing and scheduling games, and promulgating rules.
A constitution and bylaws govern its activities and those of its members.”).
See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
Standard Oil of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60–71 (1911) (surveying
historical applications of antitrust laws and § 1).
See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200 (1922); Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); Radovich
v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258
(1972); Am. Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010); Piazza v.
Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
See Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2212 (“The key is whether the alleged contract,
combination, or conspiracy is concerted action—that is, whether it joins together
separate decisionmakers. The relevant inquiry, therefore, is whether there is a
contract, combination or conspiracy amongst separate economic actors pursuing
separate economic interests such that the agreement deprives the marketplace of
independent centers of decisionmaking and therefore of diversity of
entrepreneurial interests.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). See also
Nathaniel Grow, American Needle and the Future of the Single Entity Defense
Under Section One of the Sherman Act, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 449, 449 (2011) (“The
Sherman Antitrust Act is structured around a fundamental distinction between
concerted and independent action. . . . [T]he independent actions of a single firm
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Since a professional sports league is a combination of teams
coming together to exhibit professional sporting events, some acts that
would normally violate antitrust law are allowed.27 Even though
restrictive actions are carried about by a group of teams, who are
economic rivals,28 certain conduct will not be in violation of § 1. As
one well-cited author explained:
[I]n the final analysis, the unitary nature of the NFL’s product
should weigh heavily in favor of finding single-entity status. The
NFL attempts to make NFL football as popular as possible so that
it can compete effectively against other forms of entertainment for
network television revenues. The internal restraints and agreements
made by the League are designed to promote efficiencies in
attaining this end. They are only ancillary to the main purpose of
producing a more marketable product. Viewed in this manner,
these restraints should not be subject to successful challenge under
29
the Sherman Act.

Thus, while normally a § 1 claim would be appropriate to
challenge concerted conduct, the restraint will be allowed if it is
reasonable to further the purpose and goal of the league, and the
purpose is legitimately pro-competition.
Normally, if a plaintiff can satisfy every element to a claim,
including damages, a lawsuit would be viable. However, as the next
section notes, both the courts and Congress have granted various
exemptions to antitrust law in the sports realm.

26
27
28

29

are addressed by the Sherman Act’s much narrower Section Two, which only
regulates the monopolization, or attempted monopolization, of an industry.”).
See infra Part V.C.
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98–105 (1984).
As the Supreme Court ultimately held in Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2212 (“The
NFL teams do not possess either the unitary decisionmaking quality or the single
aggregation of economic power characteristic of independent action. Each of the
teams is a substantial, independently owned, and independently managed
business. ‘[T]heir general corporate actions are guided or determined’ by
“separate corporate consciousnesses,’ and ‘[t]heir objectives are’ not
‘common.’”).
Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as A Single
Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer
Welfare Model, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1, 33 (1983).
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III. EXEMPTIONS IN SPORTS
In an attempt to help professional leagues function smoothly, the
courts and Congress have granted various exemptions that apply to all
sports.30 Although it would be logical to assume that antitrust
principles apply to all aspects of professional sports, this assumption is
faulty.31 Sports contain a combination of many different legal fields.32
Thus, a blind application of antitrust law would be inapposite to a
holistic and comprehensive view of justice.
Congress has passed acts that specifically allow leagues to engage
in activities that would normally be considered anticompetitive and,
thus, make the league liable under antitrust law.33 Congress also has
passed legislation relating to the unionization of labor groups, which
allows the players associations to bargain and agree on behalf of the
associations’ individual members.34
However, the U.S. Supreme Court also has allowed for exemptions
from antitrust law through non-statutory exemptions.35 The most
notable is the labor exemption, which allows for immunity from
antitrust law if the conduct in question contemplates a mandatory
subject matter of a typical collective bargaining agreement (CBA), in
that the subject was negotiated at arm’s length and in good faith

30

31

32

33

34
35

Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976) (discussing
the nonstatutory labor exemption).
LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, 1 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMP. TR. &
MONO. § 4:16 (4th ed.)
Labor law dictates the relationship between the player and league, and what falls
under the collective bargaining agreements. Any broadcasting rights are subject
to the standards of the Federal Communications Commission. The teams’ logos
and symbols have intellectual property implications. See Matthew J. Mitten &
Hayden Opie, “Sports Law”: Implications for the Development of International,
Comparative, and National Law and Global Dispute Resolution, 85 TUL. L.
REV. 269, 271 (2010).
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (granting immunity from antitrust liability for
acts associated with broadcasting rights and the merger of the NFL and
American Football League).
15 U.S.C. § 17 (2006).
See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200 (1922).
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between the parties.36 If these three requirements are met, then the
issue or conduct is one to be decided by labor law, and not antitrust.37
This labor exemption has an elucidatory effect. When dealing with
groups of individuals who unionize, the courts want the parties to
negotiate between themselves.38 These negotiations are then
memorialized into a CBA. The CBA has the threefold purpose of
protecting every party’s interest, redistributing wealth, and helping to
ensure the future economic growth of the league.39 Thus, courts are
hesitant to interject their opinions and rulings into matters that are very
complex, and typically the result of months or years of negotiation.40
The importance of these exemptions is that they illustrate how
certain league conduct can be immune from antitrust suits, aside from
arguing the merits and regardless of its meritorious or detrimental
effects or character.41 This recognition becomes critical as we now
shift our focus into Major League Baseball’s exemption.
IV. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL’S EXEMPTION
In 1998, Congress passed the Curt Flood Act, which codified a
longstanding tradition of case law that held baseball exempt from
antitrust liability. 42 This section will explain how Major League
Baseball became exempt through social bias and faulty interpretive
methods. The section starts by discussing the historical cases that led
to the legal decision that created the non-codified exemption, Flood v.
Kuhn.43 After discussing Flood and its progeny, this section will
conclude by examining how Congress passed the Curt Flood Act,
codifying an incorrect line of reasoning into law.

36
37

38
39
40
41
42

43

Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 611 (“The statutory exemption was created to insulate legitimate collective
activity by employees, which is inherently anticompetitive but is favored by
federal labor policy, from the proscriptions of the antitrust laws.” (citing Apex
Hoisery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940))).
Id. at 611–12.
Id.
Id. at 619.
Id.
Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–297, § 3, 112 Stat 2824 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2012)).
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
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A. Case History Pre-Flood
The foundations for Major League Baseball’s antitrust exemption
began in 1922 with the case of Federal Baseball v. National League of
Professional Base Ball Clubs.44 Federal Baseball was a challenge to
the National and American League merger.45 The plaintiffs charged
that the defendants came together as separate leagues to monopolize
the business of baseball by the use of the reserve clause.46
The reserve clause gave teams the right to exercise an option to resign a player in perpetuity.47 The club could exercise the option and
have the player re-sign with the team, or the club could assign the
option to another team.48 If the player did not want to re-sign with the
team, despite the team’s wishes, the player would not be allowed to
play in the league in the next season.49 As a result, clubs participating
in the Federal Baseball League were unable to obtain players who had
contracts with the National and American League.50
The Supreme Court, led by Justice Holmes, held that baseball was
not engaged in interstate commerce.51 The failure to satisfy this
threshold question bars relief for the claimant, irrespective of the
merits of the case. The Court’s justification was based on the principle
that Major League Baseball was not primarily engaged in interstate
commerce because teams merely exhibited baseball games.52 The

44

45
46
47

48
49
50
51

52

Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200 (1922).
Id. at 207.
Id.
Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 434 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (“The
reserve clause bound a player to either enter a new contract with the same team
in the succeeding year of the player’s contract or be considered ineligible by the
National and American Leagues to serve any baseball club.”).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 208 (1922). (“The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are
purely state affairs.”).
Id. (“But the fact that in order to give the exhibitions the Leagues must induce
free persons to cross state lines and must arrange and pay for their doing so is
not enough to change the character of the business. . . . As it is put by defendant,
personal effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce. That
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Federal Baseball holding that baseball is a game laid the groundwork
for later courts to hold that the commercial benefits that baseball
received as a result of the exhibition of their games were ancillary.
This key factor is foundational in understanding why MLB is
exempt from antitrust laws. This initial case prevented baseball from
being considered a business. It was not until 1953 in the case of
Toolson v. New York Yankees that the Supreme Court spoke again
regarding Major League Baseball.53 Player George Earl Toolson was
traded from the Newark International Baseball Club to the
Binghampton Exhibition Company, Inc.54 When Toolson refused to
report to Binghampton, he was placed on the “ineligible list” and thus
was no longer allowed to play professional baseball.55 When Toolson
learned of his banishment, he sued, arguing that the New York
Yankees, among others, were individual entities engaged in collusive
activity that unfairly restrained trade.56
Although practical logic in 1953 should have dictated the
conclusion that MLB was engaged in interstate commerce and subject
to antitrust suits, the Court refused to overrule Federal Baseball.57
With the 1950s being the “heyday” of MLB, featuring players such as
Mickey Mantle, Yogi Berra, and Bobby Thompson,58 the Court listed
four reasons why it would not overturn Federal Baseball.59
First, thirty years had passed since the Federal Baseball decision,
and Congress did not pass any legislation that placed the “business” of
baseball within the purview of antitrust law.60 Second, in those thirty
years, the business of baseball had developed while basing its
decisions on the understanding that it would not be subject to antitrust

53
54

55
56
57
58

59
60

which in its consummation is not commerce does not become commerce among
the States because the transportation that we have mentioned takes place.”).
Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 93, 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff’d, 200
F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1952), cert. granted 345 U.S. 963, aff’d 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
Id.
Id. 93–94.
Toolson, 346 U.S at 357.
Baseball’s Best: 1950’s, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/baseballs_best/mlb
_bb_library50.jsp (last updated June 6, 2011). Thompson is best known for his
“Shot Heard ‘Round the World’” in the 1951 National League Playoff. Id.
Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
Id.
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laws.61 Third, the Court was not in a position to “overrule the prior
decision and, with retrospective effect, hold the legislation
applicable.”62 Finally, the Court stated that if antitrust laws should
apply to baseball, the steps to enforce antitrust should start with the
legislature.63
B. The Seminal Case of Flood v. Kuhn
After these cases, no major controversy arose until 1969 when Curt
Flood—an all-star caliber center fielder for the St. Louis Cardinals,64
historically one of the best teams in Major League Baseball65—was
traded to the Philadelphia Phillies.66 Flood challenged the trade, and
asked the Commissioner of Baseball to reconsider the trade and allow
him to become a free agent.67 When the Commissioner refused, Flood
instituted suit challenging professional baseball’s reserve clause.68
Justice Blackmun delivered the majority opinion for the Court.69
After discussing the Federal Baseball and Toolson cases, Blackmun
discussed the relevant cases since Toolson.70 Blackmun’s critical
analysis was the case of United States v. Shubert,71 wherein the
Defendant tried to rely on the holding from Federal Baseball to argue
that the business of exhibiting vaudeville shows did not amount to

61
62
63

64
65

66
67
68
69
70
71

Id.
Id.
Id. (“We think that if there are evils in this field which now warrant application
to it of the antitrust laws it should be by legislation.”).
407 U.S. 258, 264 (1972).
The Cardinals are the second-most successful team in terms of World Series
wins in the MLB with eleven World Series Championships, rivaled only by the
New York Yankee’s twenty-seven World Series Championships. See Pete
Palmer & Gary Gillette, St. Louis Cardinals: Team History & Encyclopedia,
BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/STL/
(last updated Oct. 19, 2012).
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 265 (1972).
Id. at 265.
Id. at 258, 265.
Id. at 259.
Id. at 274-282.
348 U.S. 222 (1955).
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interstate commerce.72 Justice Blackmun noted that in Toolson Chief
Justice Warren expressly limited the holding to baseball.73
Justice Blackmun noted other cases of professional sports leagues
held to be within the purview of antitrust laws.74 Further, Blackmun
noted the extensive amount of legislative proposals to expand the
exemption which were introduced after Toolson, but which failed to
pass both houses.75 Justice Blackmun explicitly declared that “[I]t
seems appropriate to now say that . . . Professional baseball is a
business and it is engaged in interstate commerce.”76 Ultimately,
however, the majority in Flood did affirm MLB’s exemptions, and
thus held MLB’s reserve clause exempt from antitrust lawsuits.77
C. The Downfall of Flood
The 1993 case Piazza v. Major League Baseball critically analyzed
the Court’s decision in Flood and limited MLB’s exemption to the
reserve clause.78 Although Piazza was not a challenge to the reserve
clause,79 Major League Baseball attempted to invoke its immunity
from an antitrust suit based on the Flood decision.80 Judge Pavoda
opined that the Supreme Court in Flood undercut the reasoning of
Federal Baseball by holding that MLB was engaged in interstate
commerce, and he concluded that the “Flood Court viewed the
disposition in Federal Baseball and Toolson as being limited to the
reserve system, for baseball developed between 1922 and 1953 with
the understanding that its reserve system, not the game generally, was
exempt from the antitrust laws.”81 Thus, he held that “the antitrust
exemption created by Federal Baseball is limited to baseball’s reserve
72
73
74

75
76
77
78
79
80
81

Shubert, 348 U.S. at 226.
Flood, 407 U.S. at 275–77.
Id. at 276–82 (discussing United States v. Int’l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236
(1955) (boxing); Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957)
(football); Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971)
(basketball).
Id. at 281 n.17.
Id. at 282.
Id.
831 F. Supp. 420, 435 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
Id. at 423.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 436.
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system, and because the parties agree that the reserve system is not at
issue in this case, I reject Baseball’s argument that it is exempt from
antitrust liability in this case.”82
Although the case has limited precedential value, Piazza is
indicative of how interpretations of Federal Baseball, Toolson, and
Flood have evolved, signaling what may be the beginning of the end to
the MLB’s broad exemption.83 After seventy years, courts seem
willing to correct this past mistake. In Piazza, the “business of
baseball” was subject to the same antitrust scrutiny as any other sports
league.84
D. Contrary Congressional Action
After years of “punting” by the Supreme Court and the more recent
contrary case law like Piazza, Congress finally acted. In 1998 an act
was passed to codify MLB’s antitrust exemption into federal law.85
The Act, entitled the Curt Flood Act (which may be viewed as a slap
in the former all-star’s face by an occult hand), grants MLB an
excessively broad exemption with but a few exceptions to the business
of baseball, not just the reserve clause.86 Despite the small number of
exceptions to the exemption, most issues arising out of conduct that
concerns the “business of baseball” will be exempt from antitrust
lawsuits under the Act.87
This “intentional walk” for baseball was an unfortunate
consequence of weighing societal value and poor judicial decisions,
82

83

84
85

86

87

Id. at 438. Judge Pavoda added that cases from other jurisdictions applying the
exemption beyond on the reserve clause were not binding on his court and he
would not follow them, that exemptions to antitrust are to be narrowly
construed, and that “the exemption at issue has been characterized by its own
creator as an ‘anomaly’ and an ‘aberration.’” Id. at 439 (citing Flood, 407 U.S.
at 286 (Douglas, J. dissenting) (“Federal Baseball is a ‘derelict in the stream of
the law.’”)).
Compare Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200 (1922), and Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953),
and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), with Piazza v. Major League Baseball,
832 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 436.
Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–297, § 3, 112 Stat 2824 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 26b (2006)).
Id. Labor issues, umpires, and minor league players are a few of the things
outside of the scope of the act. See 15 U.S.C. § 26b(1)–(6) (2006).
Id. § 26b.
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while undervaluing more recent, appropriate case law, and should be
reversed. The next section will explain the problematic reasoning
behind the decisions above and examine contradictory case law that
carelessly was dismissed.
V. THE “INTENTIONAL WALK”
This section will show that the Curt Flood Act is unacceptable
because of the unique social influence that led to its passage, the
troubling interpretive methods employed by the Supreme Court, and
the disregard of contrary case law. This section will begin with an
analysis of the historical social view of baseball, and how that shaped
the holdings in Federal Baseball, Toolson, and Flood that ultimately
led to the passage of the Curt Flood Act. Next, the reliance on
congressional silence by the Court in Toolson will be deconstructed
and analyzed. Then, the baseball-related decisions between Federal
Baseball and Piazza will be used to demonstrate that the Act should
never have been passed if stare decisis was a factor that drove
Congress to pass the Act. This section will close by noting other
professional sports league antitrust cases that demonstrate that the
legal rationale for continued enforcement of the Act is illogical.
A. The Societal Impact of Baseball From 1922–1998
Baseball has an incredibly important place in our nation’s history
as a sport and as a cultural institution.88 Professional baseball games
date back to the mid-19th century.89 The games and players have
meant more to America than just nine innings with a stretch in the
seventh. In 1947, Jackie Robinson became the first African American
player to play in the MLB,90 sixteen years before Martin Luther King,
Jr.’s “I Have a Dream” speech.91 Baseball has produced players who
have illnesses and surgeries named after them.92 Baseball has seen this
88

89
90

91

92

See History of the Game: Doubleday to Present Day, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb
.com/mlb/history/ (last updated June 6, 2011).
Id.
Biography, JACKIEROBINSON.COM, http://www.jackierobinson.com/about/bio
.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2012).
Martin Luther King, I Have a Dream Speech (Aug. 28, 1963), available at
http://www.mlkonline.net/dream.html.
See Lou Gehrig’s Disease: Biography of Lou Gehrig, LOUGHERIG.COM, http:
//www.lougehrig.com/about/bio4.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2012); Tommy John
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country through two World Wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam War,
the Cold War, and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.93
However, the history and tradition of baseball is exactly that. The
game is still played today on a national level, but with the times, the
importance of the game has changed.94 The era when baseball was at
its biggest was the glory days of newspapers and back-page box
scores.95 Yet, with the arrival of the 1960s, when radio broadcasts
were booming and televisions were becoming fixtures in American
households, professional baseball started to see its decline.96 From
1961 to 1962, baseball and football switched positions as America’s
favorite sport in the opinion of American sports fans, going from a
once even split of 24% and 24% to 21% and 32%, respectively.97 The
gap never really closed again, and in December of 2011, 36% of those
surveyed said that professional football was their favorite sport, while
only 13% preferred baseball—a tie with those who preferred college
football.98
Unfortunately, when the Supreme Court heard Federal Baseball in
1922, the Justices were likely just as enamored with baseball as the
rest of the nation.99 Society then might have been the roaring 1920s,
but a staple in the American diet was talking about your baseball team
after checking the box score on the back page of the daily newspaper.
It was the only real game in town.100 Though the NFL did have its

93
94
95
96

97

98
99

100

Surgery, ESPN.COM, http://espn.go.com/mlb/topics/_/page/tommy-john-surgery
(last updated Dec. 5, 2012).
See History of the Game: Doubleday to Present Day, supra note 88.
See Smith, supra note 2.
See History of the Game: Doubleday to Present Day, supra note 88.
Joseph Carroll, Football Reaches Historic Popularity Levels in Gallup Poll,
GALLUP.COM (Jan. 19, 2007), http://www.gallup.com/poll/26188/footballreaches-historic-popularity-levels-gallup-poll.aspx.
Id. See also Regina A. Corso, Football is America’s New Favorite Sport as Lead
Over Baseball Continues to Grow, HARRIS.COM (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www
.harrisinteractive.com/NewsRoom/HarrisPolls/tabid/447/mid/1508/articleId/950
/ctl/ReadCustom%20Default/Default.aspx.
Id.
For example, there is evidence that Justice Holmes’ father was a baseball fan.
See Thomas V. Silvia, Baseball as a Source of Judicial Thought and
Construction, 78 MICH. B.J. 1296, 1298 n.12 (1999).
See History of the Game: Doubleday to Present Day, supra note 88.
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inaugural season in 1922,101 the first modern day Super Bowl was not
until 1967.102 At the time of the Federal Baseball decision,
professional-level, organized baseball had sixteen teams from Boston
to St. Louis103 and had enamored Americans with nineteen years of
World Series.104 Organized professional baseball had been around
since the National League was formed in 1876,105 when the eldest of
the sitting Justices in Federal Baseball was thirty-five years old, and
the youngest was just fourteen.106 Having established its reputation as
“America’s Game,” baseball was likely idolized equally by the
Supreme Court and the common man, bestowing a profound and
personal impact on both.
The crux of the argument in Federal Baseball was that MLB was
acting as a monopoly and excluding teams from joining that were in
the Federal Baseball League.107 America was fresh out of fighting the
First World War in 1919, and a decision against baseball would not
have been viewed well, as Americans were trying to regain a sense of
normalcy.108 Consider the powerful effects of the Standard Oil
decision in 1911, which ultimately destroyed John Rockefeller’s oil
empire.109 Perhaps the Justices did not want a similar destruction of
101

102

103

104

105

106
107

108

109

American Heroes, FOOTBALL HISTORIAN, http://www.footballhistorian.com/
football_heroes.cfm?page=30 (last visited Dec. 3, 2012).
History, NFL.COM, http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/image/history/pdfs/
History/Super_Bowl_Sums_2011.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2012).
Pete Palmer & Gary Gillette, 1922 Major League Baseball Team Statistics and
Standings, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.com
/leagues/MLB/1922.shtml (last visited Dec. 3, 2012).
World Series Winners, ESPN.COM, http://espn.go.com/mlb/worldseries/history
/winners (last visited Dec 3, 2012).
Peter Bendix, The History of the American and National League, Part I,
BEYONDTHEBOXSCORE.COM (Nov. 18, 2008), http://www.beyondtheboxscore
.com/2008/11/18/664028/the-history-of-the-america (noting that the World
Series was the championship crowned after the National and American Leagues
merged).
With Holmes oldest (1841) and McReynolds and Sutherland youngest (1862).
Fed. Baseball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S.
200, 207 (1922).
LYLE SPATZ & STEVE STEINBERG, Preface to 1921: THE YANKEES, THE GIANTS,
THE BATTLE FOR BASEBALL SUPREMACY IN NEW YORK xv (2010).
See Standard Oil of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 79 (1911) (“So far as the
decree held that the ownership of the stock of the New Jersey corporation
constituted a combination in violation of the 1st section and an attempt to create
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their beloved pastime, realizing that the risks in applying antitrust law
against the sport were too great. It is no stretch of the imagination that
baseball in 1922 held a similar place in the hearts of Americans as the
American flag.110
Toolson in 1953 only buttressed this stance by the Court. As noted,
American football was still fourteen years from the first Super Bowl,
and there had been thirty years of baseball as the exclusive sports
outlet for Americans. After two World Wars, and at the tail end of the
Korean War, the Court was again asked to determine whether baseball
players could bring an antitrust suit against the MLB, potentially
changing how the League operated.
The Toolson opinion contained fewer than 200 words, and the
Court refused to consider the facts of the case.111 Instead, the Court
relied on shaky interpretive methods and punted the matter to the
legislature.112 Instead of viewing the facts or hearing the claims, the
Court may have understood the societal ramifications of taking away
the blue-collar summer escape. Even in the dissent, Justice Burton
recognized the “major asset which baseball is to our Nation, the high
place it enjoys in the hearts of our people and the possible justification
of special treatment for organized sports which are engaged in
interstate trade or commerce.”113 Baseball was still the great equalizer,
and it could help jurists in Washington, D.C., or coal workers in
central Pennsylvania relate to one another through discussion of their
favorite teams, their pastime. Baseball was a uniting factor, and with
over sixty years of near exclusive control over the sports pages, the
Court would have been faced with unparalleled criticism had it
destroyed America’s beloved game.
Just as Toolson was decided shortly after the Korean War in 1953,
certiorari was granted in Flood during Vietnam in 1972.114 However,
the rise in popularity of other sports such as football seemed to
influence the Court’s decision in Flood. Flood was a challenge on the

110

111
112
113
114

a monopoly or to monopolize under the 2d section, and commanded the
dissolution of the combination, the decree was clearly appropriate.”).
See Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907) (upholding laws prohibiting flag
desecration).
See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
See infra Part V.B.
Toolson, 346 U.S. at 364 (Burton, J., dissenting).
Flood v. Kuhn, 404 U.S. 880 (1971) (granting cert.).
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reserve clause in the standard player contract in professional baseball,
just like Federal Baseball and Toolson.115 Interestingly, as the rise in
other sports’ popularity increased, the holding in Flood narrowed the
exemption that baseball enjoyed.116 In fact, in the opinion, the Court
quickly outlines other sports that did not share the exemption,
something that it did not do in Federal Baseball or Toolson.117 Flood
seemed to be indicative of baseball losing its grip on its antitrust
exemption.
Today, baseball, and specifically the MLB, does not conjure up
notions of Americanism the hearts of fans as it once did. Starting with
the MLB lockout of 1994 to 1995,118 Major League Baseball has
entered a downward spiral that it cannot seem to escape.119 The
homerun sluggers Barry Bonds,120 Mark McGwire,121 and Sammy
Sosa122 of the late 1990s and early 2000s are just now getting their
cases involving steroid use and subsequent perjury before grand juries
and Congress.123 Roger Clemens even faced trial for perjury charges
for steroid use; he later was acquitted.124 In any other sport, if these
115
116
117
118

119

120

121

122

123

124

Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
Id. at 289; see also sources cited supra notes 96–98.
Id. at 276–81.
See April Weiner, NFL and the CBA: Ranking the Worst Work Stoppages in Pro
Sports History, The Bleacher Report (Mar. 10, 2011), available at http:
//bleacherreport.com/articles/631338-nfl-and-the-cba-ranking-the-worst-workstoppages-in-pro-sports-history/page/13 (describing the 232-day lockout that
caused 938 games to be cancelled).
Andy Benoit, Football, Baseball and the Evolving Tastes of Fans, THE FIFTH
DOWN: THE N.Y. TIMES N.F.L. BLOG (April 17, 2012, 10:30 AM), http:
//fifthdown.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/04/17/football-baseball-and-the-evolvingtastes-of-fans/
Barry Bonds, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.com
/players/b/bondsba01.shtml (last visited Dec. 3, 2012).
Mark McGwire, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference
.com/players/m/mcgwima01.shtml (last visited Dec. 3, 2012).
Sammy Sosa, BASEBALL-REFERENCE.COM, http://www.baseball-reference.com
/players/s/sosasa01.shtml (last visited Dec. 3, 2012).
Paul Elias, Feds Urge Appeals Court to Uphold Bonds Conviction,
THEBIGSTORY.AP.ORG (Jul. 19, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article
/feds-urge-appeals-court-uphold-bonds-conviction.
Pete Kasperowicz, House Agrees to Aid Prosecutors in Roger Clemens Trial,
THE HILL (Feb. 17, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/house
/211433; Russell Berman, Jury Acquits Roger Clemens on Charges of Lying to
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sure-fire hall-of-fame caliber players were facing these types of
charges and allegations, it would be national, front-page news.
However, between the Mitchell Report,125 President George W. Bush’s
statements during his 2004 State of the Union,126 and Congress
proposing and enacting six different bills regarding mandatory
minimum drug testing in professional sports,127 America has become
numb to the bad acts of baseball players.
Take for instance that in 2012 the reigning National League MVP
Ryan Braun had prevailed in an appeal of his fifty-game suspension
after having tested positive for performance enhancing drugs; it was
the first time such an appeal had been successful.128 What makes the
situation worse is that Braun could not prove that the test was faulty;
he could only show that the specimen collector did not follow the
established depositing procedures, but did follow generally accepted

125

126

127

128

Congress, THE HILL (June 18, 2012 4:04 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/blogbriefing-room/news/233315.
See, e.g., Robert D. Manfred, Jr., Federal Labor Law Obstacles to Achieving a
Completely Independent Drug Program in Major League Baseball, 19 MARQ.
SPORTS L. REV. 1 (2008–2009) (summarizing the Mitchell Report, an
independent investigation into the illegal use of performance enhancing drugs in
the MLB).
See President Bush Hopeful MLB Can Turn Page on Steroids Era, ESPN (Dec.
15, 2007, 4:20 AM), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=3154659.
Manfred, Jr., supra note 125 at 1 n.2 (citing Brent D. Showalter, Comment,
Steroid Testing Policies in Professional Sports: Regulated by Congress or the
Responsibility of the Leagues?, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 651, 653 n. 13, 660–
63 (2007) (summarizing the following bills: Drug Free Sports Act, H.R. 3084,
109th Cong. (2005); Clean Sports Act of 2005, H.R. 2565, 109th Cong.
(superseded by H.R. 1862); Prof’l Sports Integrity Act of 2005, H.R. 2516,
109th Cong.; Clean Sports Act of 2005, S. 1114, 109th Cong. (companion bill to
H.R. 2565); the Integrity in Prof’l Sports Act, S. 1960, 109th Cong. (2005); and
the Prof’l Sports Responsibility and Accountability Act, S. 1334, 109th Cong.
(2005))).
Hobson Lopes, Ryan Braun Wins Appeal of Suspension: Still Guilty to the Fans,
YAHOO! (Feb. 29, 2012, 7:56 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/top/news?slug=ycn10930734.
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practices.129 Braun’s critics say that he got off on a technicality and
that justice was not done.130
Disappointingly, Ryan Braun, Barry Bonds, etc., are not the only
MLB players, past or present, that have had allegations mounted
against them. Other current players have admitted to hardcore drug use
such as crack cocaine,131 managers have gotten DUIs,132 and players
from foreign countries have been accused of using false identities and
deported.133 These black marks on the sport have taken their toll on the
reputation of MLB.
The perception that baseball is America’s pastime grounded the
Court’s decision to grant an antitrust exemption to baseball in Federal
Baseball. The idea that crossing state borders to exhibit games that
fans pay money to see is somehow not interstate commerce clearly
shows that something else was at play. It is hard to imagine that Justice
Brandeis or then Chief Justice-turned-President Taft would not hold
baseball to be interstate commerce today, as baseball is no longer the
definitive American pastime. If the same standard were applied to
professional sports today, with the NFL being the clear favorite, the
NFL would be the most appropriate organization to receive immunity
from antitrust. However, the 1957 Court in Radovich v. NFL134
explicitly held that the NFL does not have any broad immunity like
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Collector Says He Acted as Instructed, ESPN, (Feb. 29, 2012, 11:14 AM), http:
//espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/7625905/milwaukee-brewers-ryan-braun-casesample-collector-says-followed-protocols (containing the statements by the
collector of Ryan Braun’s sample saying he acted in accordance with the
policies and procedures of the testing program).
See, e.g., The Herd with Colin Cowherd, ESPN RADIO (Feb. 29, 2012)
(comparing the Braun situation to a police officer pulling someone over for
going 100 mph and writing 2012 on the ticket instead of 2011).
Ben Brown, Josh Hamilton: Rescued by Faith, BLEACHER REPORT (Feb. 28,
2009), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/131756-faith-delivered-josh-hamiltonfrom-the-control-of-heroin-and-alcohol.
Cardinals Manager Arrested for DUI in Florida, ESPN (Mar. 22, 2007, 7:36
PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2807935.
Jamele Hill, Blame the Game for Leo Nunez’s Name, ESPN (Sept. 27, 2011),
http://espn.go.com/espn/commentary/story/_/page/hill-110927/mlb-floridamarlins-share-blame-leo-nunez-fake-name-age.
352 U.S. 445, 451 (1957).
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baseball and has continued to refuse to apply any similar immunity to
the NFL since the ruling in Radovich.135
It is a different time. The fifty-year-old of today was born in 1962.
Today’s average man was raised during the NFL boom, it is unlikely
that baseball is his pastime. All of the recent polls indicate that football
is the predominant favorite American sport.136 Describing baseball as
“America’s” pastime is thus idiomatic at best. In viewing the social
preferences of today versus those at the time of Federal Baseball,
Toolson and Flood, it is clear that the melding of baseball with notions
of patriotism and American nationalism is no longer valid.
B. Faulty Interpretive Methodologies in Toolson and Flood
The interpretive methods used by the Toolson and Flood courts
were fallacious. This section will explain the Supreme Court’s reliance
on congressional silence or inaction to rule in favor of the MLB in
Toolson. By analyzing this reliance, it will be shown that the
interpretive methods relied on were faulty. Then the distinction
between reason and result stare decisis will be identified and discussed
to show that both Toolson and Flood misapplied the doctrine of stare
decisis. Finally, it will be shown that when Congress looked to these
faulty decisions to pass the Curt Flood Act, it codified the faults into
law.
1. Congressional Silence Prior to Toolson
In the Toolson decision, the Supreme Court listed four reasons why
it upheld Federal Baseball.137 The first of these factors was that
“Congress has had the ruling under consideration but has not seen fit
to bring [the baseball] business under [antitrust] laws by legislation
having prospective effect.”138 In other words, the Court took the fact
that Congress had not acted as evidence that Congress agreed with the
Court’s decision. While there are some positive benefits of giving
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136
137
138

See e.g., Am. Needle v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010) (holding
that NFL’s grant to Reebok International of an exclusive license to market NFL
team clothing “constitute[s] concerted action that is not categorically beyond the
coverage of § 1 [of the Sherman Antitrust Act.”).
Carroll, supra note 96.
Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 357 (1953).
Id.
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weight to legislative inaction,139 congressional inaction in Toolson
should not have been considered a controlling factor in the case.
First, in Justice Burton’s dissent in Toolson, with whom Justice
Reed concurred, Justice Burton pointed to a 1952 subcommittee report
on the Study of Monopoly Power which said, in relevant part, that
baseball was clearly involved with interstate commerce.140 This report
was an indication to the Supreme Court that the year before the
Toolson case was decided, Congress had serious doubts about the
exemption that the Court granted in Federal Baseball.141
Also, the Justices in Toolson didn’t recognize one of their fellow
Justices’ view on legislative silence; in Justice Burton’s view:
[A]lthough recognizing that by silence Congress at times may be
taken to acquiesce and thus approve, we should be very sure that,
under all the circumstances of a given situation, it has done so
before we so rule and thus at once relieve ourselves from and shift
to it the burden of correcting what we have done wrongly. . . . Just
as dubious legislative history is at times much overridden, so also
142
is silence or inaction often mistaken for legislation.

Thus, the Court was aware in 1946 of the dangers of relying on
legislative silence. Though the debate over the reliance on legislative
silence continues,143 the overwhelmingly dominant current theme is
that Legislative silence is one of the least reliable methods of
interpretation.144 Applying the heavy reliance on legislative silence in
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See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 31–32
(1982); see also Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 22–24 (1946)
(Rutledge, J., concurring).
Toolson, 346 U.S. at 358–59 (Burton, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 2002,
at 7 (1952) (“Inherently, professional baseball is intercity, intersectional, and
interstate.”)).
Id. at 361 n.9.
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 23–24 (1946) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring).
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV.
621 (1990). Eskridge also provides a good example of legislative silence: “The
silence of legislators can be as significant as their utterances. Sherlock Holmes
once solved a case by making inferences from the fact that a dog did not bark.”
Id. at 634.
See generally Matthew Baker, The Sound of Congressional Silence: Judicial
Distortion of the Legislative-Executive Balance of Power, 2009 B.Y.U. L. REV.
225 (2009) (arguing that courts should refrain from giving weight to judicial
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such an important case today—with facts that clearly indicate that the
group is engaged in interstate commerce—would be absurd.
2. Stare Decisis Principles
Aside from legislative silence, the Court in Flood applied the
principles of stare decisis and in doing so, the Court reaffirmed more
than fifty years of case law. 145 However, as noted in Part IV, supra,
Piazza v. MLB critically analyzed the Court’s decision in Flood and its
improper reliance on stare decisis.146 Again, MLB was sued for
violating antitrust laws unrelated to the reserve clause.147
In addressing MLB’s contention that it was exempt from antitrust
lawsuits, the Piazza Court echoed the Flood Court’s holding that MLB
was engaged in interstate commerce, essentially cancelling out
Federal Baseball and Toolson.148 Quoting Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Piazza Court identified the
principle of stare decisis—an interpretive principle heavily relied upon
in Toolson and Flood—as having two major aspects.149
The Piazza court stated that when examining a case “the Court
provides the legal standard or test that is applicable to laws implicating
a particular . . . provision.”150 Deference to another court’s choice of
rule is known as rule stare decisis,151 and it was the aspect of stare
decisis applied to the case at hand. After a court decides upon which
rule to apply, they apply it and reach their result. Deference to another
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silence because their oft frequent misconstruction of Congressional silence
causes tension between the executive and the legislature).
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. at, 284 (1972) (applying Federal Baseball and
Toolson).
Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 436–41 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(“Application of the doctrine of stare decisis simply permits no other way to
read Flood than as confining the precedential value of Federal Baseball and
Toolson to the precise facts there involved. To understand why this is so, one
must fully understand the doctrine of stare decisis and its application by lower
courts to Supreme Court decisions.”).
Id. at 434.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 438 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir.
1991)).
Id. at 437 (quoting Planned Parenthood, 947 F.2d at 691–92).
James Hardisty, Reflections on Stare Decisis, 55 IND. L.J. 41, 52–53 (1979).

2013

Grounding Into a Double Standard

327

court’s result is known as result stare decisis.152 This dichotomy seems
straightforward enough. According to the Piazza court the Supreme
Court in Flood did not apply rule stare decisis in upholding the
exemption.153 Instead, the Court applied result stare decisis and
effectively “invalidate[d] the rule of Federal Baseball and
Toolson.”154 The Piazza court concluded that the Supreme Court’s
invalidation of the reasoning in Flood meant that stare decisis should
not decide the case before it.155
Combining this ruling with the theories that discredit the use of
legislative inaction, the Piazza court suggested that Flood was wrong
in holding that there should be a continued exemption to the “business
of baseball.”156 It also bolsters the proposition that Congress relied
wrongly on the Flood decision in enacting the exemption into law; a
proposition that reinforces the need to repeal the exemption.
C. Current Analogous, Contradictory Case Law
Finally, looking back to Piazza v. MLB, the court held that only the
reserve system was exempt and that the “business of baseball” was
well within the purview of antitrust law.157 Other case law since the
passage of the Curt Flood Act has held that other professional sports
entities are subject to the Sherman Act.158
First, and most importantly, the 1957 case of Radovich v. NFL
refused to allow the NFL an exemption similar to MLB.159 Most
recently, in American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League,160 the
Supreme Court unanimously held that the NFL, America’s most
popular sports league,161 and the National Football League Players
Association (NFLPA) are subject to antitrust law and do not act as a
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Id.
Piazza, 831 F. Supp. at 438.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 440.
Id. at 435 (listing various professional sports that have been subjected to the
Sherman Act).
Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
See supra Part IV.A.
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single entity.162 Other case law has established that the National
Hockey League (NHL) cannot shield itself with a single entity
defense.163 The Courts’ holdings in these cases showed judicial
unwillingness to grant an exemption from antitrust lawsuits to any
other major sports league.164 These cases support the assertion that if
the issue were one of first impression today, the Court would not
create an exemption for baseball. And while the Court may disapprove
of its earlier decision, its mistaken rule of law is now codified and may
only be corrected legislatively.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
This section will take the analysis of Section V and propose a new
approach to Major League Baseball’s exemption to antitrust law under
the Curt Flood Act. After combining all of the fallacies that led to the
codified exemption, this section will conclude that MLB no longer
deserves an exemption.
As Section V discusses, flawed reasoning and social influences led
Congress to the unfortunate passage of the Curt Flood Act. By straying
from the fundamental basis of antitrust law, which places great
emphasis on consumer protection, the Act places arbitrary emphasis on
the game of Baseball. Combining MLB’s apparent inability to regulate
itself, the game’s loss of credibility in the national spotlight, and the
loss of admiration among Americans, it is time to repeal the Curt
Flood Act. The Supreme Court holdings in Federal Baseball, Toolson,
and Flood were flawed and legally unsound due to reliance on dubious
interpretive methods and heavy social influence. Furthermore, the
Act’s purpose—protecting a game with an inflated sense of its own
relevance to modern society—is illegitimate. Baseball is an important
sport in America, but it is not the most important sport. In relying on
these cases to formulate the Curt Flood Act, Congress ignored the
contradictory case law and to this day continues to allow an outdated,
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poorly based exemption to stand. It is time to recognize these mistakes
and correct the course by repealing MLB’s broad antitrust exemption.
Making MLB subject to the same standards as other leagues would
not impose any kind of an undue burden on MLB. The repeal of the
Act would put MLB under the same rules as any other professional
sports league, and football seems to be doing just fine. In addition,
repeal would foster greater competition between the clubs, it would
enhance the open markets in which baseball deals, and would force the
owners to seek out more competitive deals with players, owners,
teams, networks, and everyone else involved in the production of
baseball. This competition would help cut costs. By enhancing the
clubs’ freedom to open-bid their contracts—similar to the NFL’s
practices—costs of certain things such as hats and bats will decrease
because the contract would go to the most competitive bidder. The
lower the expenditures, the higher the potential for profit, and the
money saved by the clubs could go to be more competitive. For
example, money saved could be spent to acquire free agents or to
retain current players, thus preventing the loss of good players to other
teams.165 In addition, being more competitive as a team would increase
attendance and viewership, and being more competitive as a business
would increase revenue. Increased revenue and greater attendance
would further enhance the competition between the teams. All of these
measures would ensure that the consumer is getting the best product
available, fulfilling the purpose of antitrust law.
However, repeal of the Curt Flood Act would not mean that every
action that Major League Baseball makes would be subject to antitrust
law. By repealing the Act, Congress would leave the current legal
landscape to its own devices. The courts take a case-by-case approach
to antitrust claims, and MLB may fend off claims just as well as other
antitrust defendants have prevailed. The difference is that the
defendants will win or lose on the merits of the case, and the outcomes
will conform to the goals of antitrust law. The result of repealing the
Act would be to allow the courts to determine what type of actions are
unreasonable restraints on trade made between colluding economic
rivals, instead of having their hands tied by an antiquated and
illegitimate federal statute.
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